Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104773 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 09/2014
Publisher: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Abstract: 
The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterising tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings originating from the deterrence model are contrasted with predictions which result from a simple model of criminal activity and law enforcement.
Subjects: 
Economics of Crime
Income Tax
Tax Evasion
JEL: 
H24
H26
K34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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