Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/114710 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance [ISSN:] 1057-2287 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF) [Place:] Montrose, CA [Year:] 2001 [Pages:] 24-43
Publisher: 
The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF), Montrose, CA
Abstract: 
We examine the relationship between the small business loan guarantee and the agency problem of small firms. We then recommend financial instruments or financial contracts that can minimize of eliminate the moral hazard problem.
Subjects: 
Loan Guarantee
Small Business Lending
Agency Problem
Risk
Small Business
Moral Hazard
JEL: 
M13
Document Type: 
Article

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