Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19990 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy No. 4504
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena
Abstract: 
The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans issued to new ventures. The analysis finds a convex U-shaped relationship. The results indicate that while provision of collateral initially reduces bank exposure to risk (through security, more optimal levels of capital and lower moral hazard among entrepreneurs) that beyond a point the positive risk-wealth association gives rise to greater risk taking propensity among entrepreneurs and ultimately higher interest rates. This indicates that a lender's pricing policy may even somewhat help to level the competitive playing field between ventures launched by higher and moderately wealthy entrepreneurs
Subjects: 
asymetric information
bank lendig
credit constraints
JEL: 
G21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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