Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22428 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeitrag No. 316
Publisher: 
Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Hannover
Abstract: 
The EU Directive 2003/87/EC for the introduction of a European emission trading system has left the task of allocating the emission allowances mainly to the member states. In Germany the details of the allocation method are laid down in the Allocation Act (ZuG 2007). One central element of the Allocation Act is the so called transfer-rule, which is intended to provide incentives for the replacement of emission intensive installations and thus to achieve environmental benefits. This paper takes a closer look at the transfer-rule?s ecological impacts and competitive effects in the field of electricity generation. The analysis suggests that the investment incentives provided by the transfer-rule are limited and uncertain, while at the same time the overall amount of emissions from participants of the trading scheme will not be reduced. Instead the transfer-rule causes windfall profits for incumbent generators and leads to a significant distortion of competition. This cannot be justified by environmental benefits as has been done by the German government and the European Commission.
Subjects: 
Emission Trading
Competition
Electricity
JEL: 
Q28
L94
L49
Q48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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