Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26645 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2600
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.
Subjects: 
Run-off
municipal elections
political bargaining
property
JEL: 
H71
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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