Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35017 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3282
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper develops a partial equilibrium model to account for stylized facts about the behavior of oligarchs, politically and economically strong conglomerates in transition and developing countries. The model predicts that oligarchs are more likely than other owners to invest in productivity enhancing projects and to vertically integrate firms to capture the gains from possible synergies and, thus, oligarchs can be productive. Using a unique dataset comprising almost 2,000 Ukrainian open joint stock companies, the paper tests empirical implications of the model. In contrast to commonly held views, econometric results suggest that, after controlling for endogeneity of ownership, oligarchs can improve the performance of the firms they own relative to other firms.
Subjects: 
Oligarch
transition
firm performance
property rights
treatment effect
JEL: 
C21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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