Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35480 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3745
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper contributes to the literature on competition and corruption, by drawing on records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian soccer league. Unlike previous studies, we can estimate the determinants of match rigging and use this information in identifying corruption episodes in years in which there are no pending judicial inquiries. We find evidence of corruption activity well before Calciopoli. Career concerns of referees seem to play a major role in match rigging. An implication of our study is that a more transparent selection of the referees and evaluation of their performance is essential in removing incentives to match rigging. Another implication is that in presence of significant winners-take-all effects, more competitive balance may increase corruption unless media concentration is also significantly reduced.
Schlagwörter: 
Concentration
corruption
career concerns
random effect ordered probit
Monte Carlo simulations
soccer
JEL: 
D73
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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