Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53200 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 41.2011
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic interpretation: In many circumstances it will neither reflect the expected extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single out a particularly disruptive subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This cardinality has an economic interpretation: the subset is a justified objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove multiple properties relevant for a workable measure of comparison.
Subjects: 
Stable Marriage Problem
Matching
Blocking Pair
Instability
Matching Comparison
Decentralized Market
Bargaining Set
JEL: 
C0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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