Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54587 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2011-102
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median voter in a Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real co-players has a negative effect on the median voter's tax rate choice. Further, perceived income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not play a role in the political economy context.
Subjects: 
Redistribution
other-regarding preferences
median voter
experiments
JEL: 
C91
D03
D72
D78
H20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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