Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/67833 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1169
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
We consider a competitive extraction industry comprising many small firms, each with a slightly different quality of mineral holdings. With rapidly declining quality of holding per firm we observe rent declining over an interval. We then take up the familiar planning model and isolate the tax required to make decentralized extraction by many distinct, competitive firms replicate the planning solution.
Subjects: 
exhaustible resources
resource rent
competitive extraction
corrective tax
JEL: 
D41
Q31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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