Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/67833 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1169
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a competitive extraction industry comprising many small firms, each with a slightly different quality of mineral holdings. With rapidly declining quality of holding per firm we observe rent declining over an interval. We then take up the familiar planning model and isolate the tax required to make decentralized extraction by many distinct, competitive firms replicate the planning solution.
Schlagwörter: 
exhaustible resources
resource rent
competitive extraction
corrective tax
JEL: 
D41
Q31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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