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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP04/13
Verlag: 
University College Dublin, Department of Economics, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies a policymaker’s optimal choice between redistribution and efficient public investment. Under political instability, there is myopic government behavior which results in underinvestment. Above some critical value of political instability, it is optimal not to invest at all. This finding also suggests that it may be rational for governments to refrain from anti-corruption investment, even if they are not rent-seeking themselves.
Schlagwörter: 
political instability
myopic behavior
public investment
corruption
political economy
transition and developing countries
JEL: 
E62
O23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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