Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73445 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 100
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Improving retailers' incentives for service is a prominent efficiency defense for resale price maintenance (RPM). We investigate the incentives of symmetric manufacturers to use RPM when selling products through common retailers who provide services such as pre-sale advice. We show that the possibility to use minimum RPM can create a dilemma for manufacturers when retailers influence consumer choice through service. If price competition among retailers is strong, a manufacturer benefits from introducing minimum RPM as it incentivizes retailers to favor the sales of her product. However, other manufacturers follow into RPM. In the symmetric equilibrium, service is unbiased, but retail margins and consumer prices are higher than without RPM. In turn, manufacturers' profits and social welfare are lower. This challenges the service argument as an efficiency defense for RPM.
Schlagwörter: 
biased sales advice
common agency
manufacturer dilemma
matching
RPM
vertical restraints
JEL: 
D83
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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