Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77795 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 335-358
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces and studies the role of managerial attention allocation constraints in incentive contracts. We extend the traditional moral-hazard benchmark model with multi-tasking and linear incentive contracts by letting the principal choose the amount of monitoring allocated across tasks. In our model, more attention allocated to a task improves the task contractibility and consequently increases the effort provided by the agent. Our findings show that, even under symmetry, in the presence of increasing returns to scale in either production or monitoring the principal may optimally offer an unbalanced incentive contract while allocating different amounts of attention across tasks. Finally, we comment on the empirical content of our model.
Schlagwörter: 
incentive contracts
attention allocation
rational inattention
monitoring
JEL: 
D86
L14
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
306.77 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.