Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78433 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 15/2000
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
So far, the existing literature on the hold-up problem with renegotiation has imposed assumptions such that the post-renegotiation payoffs are absolutely continuous functions. Since payoffs may fail to be differentiable at the investment profile to be sustained, first order conditions for incentives to invest must be handled with care. To avoid these difficulties, the present paper propagates a more elementary approach. A general condition is provided which necessarily must hold for an investment profile to be sustainable by a message contingent contract. If only one of the parties invests or, more generally, if investments can be aggregated into one dimension then the paper introduces assumptions leading to conditions which are necessary and sufficient for an investment profile to be sustainable.
Schlagwörter: 
hold-up problem
renegotiation
mechanism design
message contingent contracts
JEL: 
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
328.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.