Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86086 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 03-008/2
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.
Subjects: 
Cartel stability
trigger strategy
subjective beliefs.
JEL: 
L12
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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