Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/91223 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 1593
Publisher: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Abstract (Translated): 
The aim of this work is to investigate the relations between Brazilian decision making process and federalism through political process of Fiscal Responsability Law. There're some political scientists' visions that legislative projects undermining the subnational governments' interests are not often approved due to State governors' efforts to veto them. They assume that governors are veto-players in the Brazilian political system. Our research seeks to explain why Fiscal Responsibility Law was approved despite of the key players' financial and fiscal interests. The novelty of this work is to provide an approach about: the incremental process of institutional change and the development of a 'fiscal culture' in the Brazilian society and its political class; the process of negotiation of the law project in the Federal Executive and in the Federal Legislative; the effects of international financial crisis (México, 1995; Ásia, 1997 e Rússia, 1998). The process of negotiation that gave rise to the Fiscal Responsibility Law was characterized by the existence of a dissension inside of consensus.
JEL: 
Z1
Z19
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
386.59 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.