Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93806 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 418
Publisher: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Abstract: 
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players '€˜evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
Subjects: 
Conflict
Contest
Endogenous fighting
Balance of power
Evolutionary stability
JEL: 
D72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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