Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102716 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 161
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Whereas exchange asymmetries for goods are well known, we provide a first incentivized test of exchange asymmetries for bads (i.e., items yielding a negative utility). On the one hand, prospect theory predicts an endowment effect for goods and bads, on the other hand, attention-based theories such as salience theory predict an endowment effect for goods, but a reverse endowment effect (i.e., a particular high willingness to switch) for bads. Since both strands of research often make the same predictions concerning biased decision making, the investigation of exchange asymmetries for bads is a key element to distinguish between their validity. In our experiment, we find a strong endowment effect for bads, so that our results speak in favor of prospect theory.
Schlagwörter: 
Loss Aversion
Salience Theory
Prospect Theory
Endowment Effect
JEL: 
D03
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-160-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
4.85 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.