Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103735 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 75
Verlag: 
University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Tübingen
Zusammenfassung: 
Commodity markets are characterized by large volumes of forward contracts as well as high volatility. They are often accused of weak competitive pressure. This article extends the existing literature by analyzing tacit collusion of firms, forward trading and volatility simultaneously. The expected collusive pro t may depart from the monopoly outcome in a volatile market (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). Introducing forward trading enables firms to gain the expected monopoly pro t for a broader range of parameters. In contrast to a deterministic market (Liski and Montero, 2006), trading forward in a volatile market may lead to an expected collusive pro t below the monopoly one.
Schlagwörter: 
Industrial organization
Forward trading
Collusion
Energy Markets
JEL: 
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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