Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/114020 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9148
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Dismissal disputes occur mostly in recessions and often lead to long and costly contract termination procedures. This paper investigates how dispute procedures may affect the job-matching process. First we present a simple accounting frame- work that corresponds with general dismissal legislation, but is sufficiently flexible to accommodate country-specific legislation. Detailed information from a sample of 2,191 disputes that occurred in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2009 is used to adjust the framework to Dutch institutional specificity. The resulting equilibrium matching model is solved to explain endogenous sorting between lengthy and costly firing procedures. The model also rationalizes the longevity of the dual Dutch model and its political resilience.
Schlagwörter: 
disputes
firing
legislation
sorting
JEL: 
E24
J08
J38
K31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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