Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119519 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2015-04
Verlag: 
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE), Quezon City
Zusammenfassung: 
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as Coase's 'ownership', Williamson's 'hostage', Klein et al's "vertical ownership", Grossman and Hart's "assignment of residual rights", etc have been proposed. The principal's decision to appropriate the quasi-rent generated by the agent delivering effort first under possibly weak public ordering and non-zero retrievability of delivered effort is explicitly modeled. We give the sufficient conditions for the preservation of the incentives compatibility of the simple P-A effort-in-advance contract in the D3 environment.
Schlagwörter: 
incentives compatibility
quasi-rent appropriation
retrievability
incentives contract
JEL: 
D52
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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