Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119714 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 106.2002
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Based on a result due to Ray and Vohra showing the possibility of inefficiency due to a coalition formation in an international emission reduction game, we consider a possibility of negotiation preceding the negotiation stage, and by means of an example, indicate that the efficiency is restored. In the equilibrium obtained, we observe a potential in which different set of coalition arises in the two stages, which could help explain what is going on in the international negotiation.
Schlagwörter: 
Prenegotiation
coalition formation
international emission reduction game
JEL: 
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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