Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/122061 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 722
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule with veto power (Veto) - that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in the EU institutions and could help to inform debates about policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US.
Schlagwörter: 
Unanimity rule
Veto power
Information aggregation
Pareto criterion
Constructive abstention
JEL: 
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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