Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/123417 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Discussion Paper No. 2011/06
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 71 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are 7 percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption as well as the absence of corruption.
Schlagwörter: 
Political selection
public servants
incompatibility
political representation
corruption
government consumption
JEL: 
D72
K39
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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