Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150165 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 57-98
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely Directed Rationalizability. (See Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003.) We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.
Subjects: 
Epistemic game theory
forward induction
extensive form best response set
directed rationalizability
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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