Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170957 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10973
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Governments in new democracies launch social policies with the purported goal of alleviating the effects of poverty among the most vulnerable households, usually low income families with children. However, this goal is can be thwarted by the clientelistic distribution of social policies' benefits because politicians seek to maximize political support and children do not vote. Based on the main Argentine household survey and on personal interviews with 120 brokers, this paper shows that brokers collect information on family size and age composition and allocate temporary public works programs that are in excess demand discriminating against families with children not old enough to vote.
Subjects: 
clientelism
household
discrimination
social policy
Latin America
Argentina
JEL: 
K40
H53
I38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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