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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 14/196
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria (as the players become infinitely patient) need not be unique.
Schlagwörter: 
Strategic Bargaining
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Stationary Strategies
Nash Bargaining Solution
JEL: 
C72
C78
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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