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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 200
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version, June 2017
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research approach, but the best approach is unknown. Inducing a variety of research approaches is desirable because it generates an option value. We show that suitable contests can induce such variety. The optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where suppliers can choose only between a low bid and a high bid. We then compare the optimal contest to other commonly studied institutions, such as scoring auctions and fixed-prize tournaments.
Schlagwörter: 
Contests
tournaments
auctions
diversity
innovation
procurement
JEL: 
L14
L22
L23
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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