Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/174360 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Ruhr Economic Papers No. 742
Verlag: 
RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
Although public support for renewable energy promotion in Germany is strong, the required power line construction has incited a groundswell of opposition from residents concerned about the impacts on their neighborhoods. This paper evaluates a large randomized one-shot binary-choice experiment to examine the effect of different compensation schemes on the acceptance of new power line construction. Results reveal that community compensations have no bearing on the acceptance level, whereas personal compensations have a negative effect. Two possible channels through which financial compensation reduces the willingness-to-accept are (1) crowding out of intrinsic motivation to support the construction project and (2) a signaling effect that alerts residents to potential negative impacts of the power lines. Both explanations call into question the efficacy of financial payments to decrease local opposition.
Schlagwörter: 
not-in-my-backyard
willingness to accept
motivation crowding out
randomized discrete choice experiment
JEL: 
M52
C93
Q40
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-862-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
355.89 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.