Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177143 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11339
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In this study, we leverage on Italy's size-contingent firing restrictions to identify the causal effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on firm-provided training using a regression discontinuity design. Our analysis demonstrates that higher levels of EPL reduce incentives for firms to invest in workers' training. The number of trained workers falls by about 1.5-1.9 units at the threshold: this is not a negligible effect, corresponding to a 16-20% reduction in the number of trained workers. The results are robust to several sensitivity checks and controls for potential confounding factors (e.g. work councils). The effect of EPL on training is not mediated by different levels of investment in physical capital or propensities to innovate, while it is mostly accounted for by higher worker turnover and more use of temporary contracts, which entail less training, in firms with higher firing costs. Our study highlights the potential adverse effects of EPL on worker training in dual labour markets, owing to larger firms seeking to avoid the higher costs of EPL by means of temporary contracts.
Subjects: 
employment protection legislation
firing costs
training
Italy
JEL: 
J42
J63
J65
M53
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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