Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180526 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11508
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In light of increasing health care expenditures, patient cost-sharing schemes have emerged as one of the main policy tools to reduce medical spending. We show that the effect of patient cost-sharing schemes on health care expenditures is not only determined by the economic incentives they provide, but also by the way these economic incentives are framed. Patients react to changes in economic incentives almost twice as strongly under a deductible policy than under a no-claims refund policy. Our preferred explanation is that individuals are loss-averse and respond differently to both schemes because they perceive deductible payments as a loss and no-claim refunds as a gain.
Subjects: 
patient cost-sharing
health insurance
framing
loss aversion
JEL: 
I13
D91
H51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
504.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.