Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184486 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] DANUBE: Law, Economics and Social Issues Review [ISSN:] 1804-8285 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] De Gruyter [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 277-285
Publisher: 
De Gruyter, Warsaw
Abstract: 
The present article discusses the economic and legal effects of single-product loyalty discounts. It is clear that arguments concerning the "pro-competitive" effects of such discounts must be judged with skepticism. This applies in particular to the assumed effects of loyalty discounts resulting from double profit surcharges or falling average costs, as well as in the context of price discrimination. I argue that many of the alleged effects could also be achieved with discount forms where the risk of restrictive effects on competition should be lower. Also, the assumed anti-competitive effects of loyalty discounts must be better justified economically. This article suggests using a form-based approach for the assessment of discount schemes. However, this should not amount to a restrictive assessment of certain discount schemes. For the development of such a form-based approach, it is necessary to review the theories about pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. Therefore, this article attempts to identify which positive effects are more likely to be achieved by means of which discount forms and under which circumstances.
Subjects: 
Discounts
Economies of Scale
Predatory Competition
Pro-competitive Effects
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.