Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184756 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 805
Publisher: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Abstract: 
This paper characterizes the optimal advertising strategy of candidates in an election campaign, where groups of heterogeneous voters are targeted through media outlets. We discuss its effects on the implemented policy and relate it to the well-documented increase in polarization. Additionally, we empirically establish that polarization displays electoral cycles. These cycles emerge in the model as candidates find it optimal to cater to different groups of voters and thus to adjust policies. Further, technologies that allow targeting voters more precisely tend to increase polarization. Our prediction is confirmed empirically as an increase in internet penetration leads to higher polarization.
Subjects: 
Targeting
Media
Networks
Voting
JEL: 
D85
D72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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