More on Phantom Bidding

Wang, Ruqu; Bag, Parimal Kanti; Dinlersoz, Emim Murat

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189268

Title:

More on Phantom Bidding

Authors:

Wang, Ruqu
Bag, Parimal Kanti
Dinlersoz, Emim Murat

Year of Publication:

1998

Series/Report no.:

Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 976

Publisher:

Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)

Abstract:

A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following questions are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.

Subjects:

English Auction
Phantom Bidding
Fixed/Flexible Reserve Price

JEL:

D44

Document Type:

Working Paper

Appears in Collections:

Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper, Department of Economics (QED), Queen’s University

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