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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1078
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm's decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions, a firmrm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable profit maximizing firm. In the absence of externalities, equilibrium with a monopoly will be Pareto efficient if the firm can price discriminate. The equilibrium can be implemented by a 2-part tariff.
Schlagwörter: 
Externality
general equilibrium
2-part tariff
objective function of the firm
JEL: 
D52
D70
L20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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