Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189462 
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 97-18
Publisher: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Abstract: 
Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two ""like minded"" individuals cannot ""agree to disagree"" in the following sense. If they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (using Bayes'' rule) on the basis of private information, then it cannot be common knowledge between them that individual 1 assigns probability p to E and individual 2 assigns probability q to E with p ¹ q. In other words, if their posteriors of event E are common knowledge then they must coincide. Aumann''s Agreement Theorem has given rise to a large literature which we review in this paper. The results are classified according to whether they are probabilistic (Bayesian) or qualitative. Particular attention is paid to the issue of how to interpret the notion of Harsanyi consistency as a (local) property of belief hierarchies.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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