Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192895 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 286
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
Subjects: 
Contests
mixed-strategy equilibrium
rent dissipation
uniqueness
JEL: 
C72
D72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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