Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/198939 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7579
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
The standard assumption of exogenous policy preferences implies that parties set their positions according to their voters’ preferences. We investigate the reverse effect: Are the electorates’ policy preferences responsive to party positions? In a representative German survey, we inform randomized treatment groups about the positions of political parties on two family policies, child care subsidy and universal student aid. In both experiments, results show that the treatment aligns the preferences of specific partisan groups with their preferred party’s position on the policy under consideration, implying endogeneity of policy preferences. The information treatment also affects non-partisan swing voters.
Subjects: 
political parties
partisanship
survey experiment
information
endogenous preferences
voters
family policy
JEL: 
D72
D83
H52
J13
I28
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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