Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200296 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IFS Working Papers No. W18/07
Publisher: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Abstract: 
Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such schemes are typically designed retrospectively following the bulk acquisition of information on offshore holdings, such as the recent "Paradise" and "Panama" papers. They offer an opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced fine rates for truthful disclosure. We characterize the taxpayer/tax authority game with and without a scheme and show that a scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal offshore investment, increases onshore investment, and could either increase or decrease total offshore investment (legal plus illegal).
Subjects: 
voluntary disclosure
offshore tax evasion
tax amnesty
third-party information
JEL: 
H26
D85
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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