Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200312 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Papers No. W18/23
Verlag: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies regulatory policy interventions aimed at protecting vulnerable consumers who are disengaged and thus exposed to exploitation. We model heterogeneous consumer switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets in which established rms are challenged by new entrants. We identify circumstances under which such interventions can be counterproductive, both with regard to the stated consumer protection objective and the complementary aim to promote competition.
Schlagwörter: 
switching costs
price discrimination
uniform pricing
most-favoured customer clauses
price regulation
competition
JEL: 
L11
L13
D4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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