Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200599 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-09
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Billions of dollars have been spent on pilot programs searching for ways to reduce healthcare costs. I study one such program, where hospitals pay doctors bonuses for reducing the total hospital costs of admitted Medicare patients (a "bundled payment"). Doctors respond to the bonuses by becoming more likely to admit patients whose treatment can generate high bonuses, and sorting healthier patients into participating hospitals. Conditional on patient health, however, doctors do not reduce costs or change procedure use. These results highlight the ability of doctors to game incentive schemes, and the risks of basing nationwide healthcare reforms on pilot programs.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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