Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201395 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1814
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Macroprudential policies for financial institutions have received increasing prominence since the global financial crisis. These policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. For this purpose, we develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistically competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999-2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating the macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. We discuss how regulators that either do or do not consider credit leakage to shadow banks set policy in response to macroeconomic shocks. Lastly, in a counterfactual analysis, we then compare how a macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis on all financial institutions, or just on commercial banks, would have dampened the leverage cycle.
Schlagwörter: 
Macroprudential Regulation
Monetary Policy
Shadow Banking
Non-Bank Financial Institutions
Financial Frictions
JEL: 
E58
F45
G23
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.53 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.