Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201875 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7649
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This study provides further empirical evidence on pricing by international airline alliances. The paper covers a long sample period, which runs from 1997 to 2016, and it supplements the usual USDOT fare data with confidential fare data reported by the foreign alliance partners of US carriers. The empirical results for connecting service match earlier findings, with alliances charging lower fares than nonaligned carriers. The GTG results imply that, in the latter part of the sample period, granting antitrust immunity to two previously nonaligned carriers is equivalent to removing a competitor, with a consequent increase in fares (an effect seldom seen in previous work).
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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