Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202618 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 10/2017
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility by means of the concepts of preference restrictions and likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. Finally, we use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game.
Schlagwörter: 
Non-cooperative games
proper rationalizability
iterated admissibility
bargaining
JEL: 
C72
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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