Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202625 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 04/2018
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
Our lab experiment tests for strategic ignorance about the environmental consequences of one's actions. In a binary dictator situation based on the design by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007), we test whether the option to remain ignorant about the receiver's payoffs reduces generosity. Our receiver is a charity that engages in carbon offset. Contrary to previous findings by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) and replications, the option to remain ignorant does not decrease generosity. Only 22% of dictators choose ignorance. We test social interaction by allowing another subject to force the dictator to learn the receiver's payoff, and by allowing the dictator to sanction that subject. When information can be imposed by another subject, almost all dictators choose information themselves, but this does not increase generosity. The possibility of sanctions does not discourage subjects from providing information to dictators.
Subjects: 
Strategic ignorance
dictator game
experiment
social sanctions
carbon offset
JEL: 
C92
D63
Q50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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