Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204758 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 47
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the use of fi nancial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the "volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
Coordination
Volunteers dilemma
Forward markets
power market
JEL: 
D21
D44
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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