Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206597 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 457 [Publisher:] Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2019
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers' access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.
Schlagwörter: 
self-employment
poverty
labor earnings
JEL: 
E26
J46
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
378.83 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.