Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207400 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12574
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We build a model where firm size is a source of labor market power. The key mechanism is that a granular employer can eliminate its own vacancies from a worker's outside option in the wage bargain. Hence, a granular employer does not compete with itself. We show how wages depend on employment concentration and then use the model to quantify the effects of granular market power. In Austrian micro-data, we find that granular market power depresses wages by about ten percent and can explain 40 percent of the observed decline in the labor share from 1997 to 2015. Mergers decrease competition for workers and reduce wages even at non-merging firms.
Schlagwörter: 
market power
labor share
search and matching
JEL: 
J31
J42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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