Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

Strobl, Eric; Walsh, Frank A.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20832

Title:

Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

Authors:

Strobl, Eric
Walsh, Frank A.

Year of Publication:

2003

Series/Report no.:

IZA Discussion Papers No. 661

Publisher:

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn

Abstract:

Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Subjects:

efficiency wages
monitoring

JEL:

J41

Document Type:

Working Paper

Appears in Collections:

IZA Discussion Papers, IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

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